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We study whether people became less likely to switch Medicare pre-
scription drug plans (PDPs) due to more options and more time in 
Part D. Panel data for a random 20 percent sample of enrollees from 
2006–2010 show that 50 percent were not in their original PDPs by 
2010. Individuals switched PDPs in response to higher costs of their 
status quo plans, saving them money. Contrary to choice overload, 
larger choice sets increased switching unless the additional plans 
were relatively expensive. Neither switching overall nor responsive-
ness to costs declined over time, and above-minimum spending in 
2010 remained below the 2006 and 2007 levels. (JEL H51, I13, I18)
Across a range of contexts, researchers are reevaluating the long-held view that 
consumers benefit from being offered more options. A leading challenge to this 
view is the hypothesis that facing more options impairs decision making through 
a set of phenomena known as “choice overload” (Diehl and Poynor 2010; Iyengar 
and Lepper 2000), “status quo bias” (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), “inertia” 
(Dube, Hitsch, and Rossi 2010) and “the paradox of choice” in which “more is 
less” (Schwartz 2004). Each of these terms carries somewhat different connotations 
and is ascribed to various underlying economic and psychological causes. Their 
common predictions, however, are that facing more options makes consumers less 
satisfied with their available options and with their chosen options and more likely 
to stay with their status quo, even if the status quo is making no purchase at all. Yet 
a recent experiment on the elderly population specifically (Besedeš et al. 2012) and 
a meta-analysis by Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd (2010) yield conclusions 
antipodal to these other frequently cited studies, concluding instead that consumers 
benefit from additional options.
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Similarly divergent evidence exists regarding the effects of experience on the 
dynamics of consumer decision making. For example, List (2003) and Miravete 
(2003) provide evidence that learning through experience creates financial benefits 
to consumers and ameliorates certain types of consumer biases. Studies in a range 
of other contexts, however, show that as individuals gain experience with a good or 
service over time, they become less likely to switch to an alternative (Osborne 2011; 
Heilman, Bowman, and Wright 2000; Prince 2011; Israel 2005a).
Medicare Part D represents a prominent setting where research can provide new 
insights to these tensions regarding inertia, choice overload, and experience. In con-
trast with Medicare’s traditional design, since its beginning in 2006 Part D has relied 
on enrollees to choose their prescription drug coverage from private insurers com-
peting within a government-created, taxpayer-subsidized market. Part D’s relevance 
to choice overload stems from the high potential for the presence of such effects 
given the large number of complex products and the health and demographics of 
the consumers. Likewise, an attractive feature of Part D for evaluating the effects of 
experience is that it offers the rare ability for researchers to observe each consumer’s 
entire experience across all firms in the market. Despite researchers’ broad interests 
in the effects of choice overload and experience on consumer decision making and 
the policy relevance of the Part D context, research has not yet examined how such 
factors influence consumers’ dynamic decisions to switch between Medicare pre-
scription drug plans (PDPs).
This article has two primary objectives. First, we seek to learn how within-person 
changes in the number of options affects the likelihood of switching and how these 
effects differ when the additional options are relatively low cost versus relatively 
expensive to the individual. Second, we evaluate the within-person changes in the 
likelihood of switching over time. To achieve these objectives we analyze a ran-
dom 20 percent sample of the entire population enrolled in a PDP, with a few addi-
tional criteria for inclusion in our study sample described below. For this sample we 
rely on rich data and previously untapped institutional knowledge within CMS to 
develop an accurate method of calculating what each person would have spent in 
each available plan under a few alternative modeling approaches. We also use these 
resources to establish accurate measures of switching, experience, and the number 
of plans available in the region overall and the number available by each level of 
cost to each individual.
With these data we estimate empirical models of switching between PDPs that 
account for individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity, within-person changes in 
health over time, and other factors. To evaluate the role of choice overload on iner-
tia, we rely on within-person changes over time in the total number of plans in their 
choice set. We also consider how switching decisions vary as the choice set expands 
due to changes in the number of low cost versus high cost plans and otherwise hold-
ing constant the overall choice set size. In our models, we evaluate the main effect of 
the number of plans on switching. We also study how the number of available plans 
affects how responsive people are to upcoming changes in their status quo plans’ 
costs relative to the available alternatives.
The results provide no evidence that larger choice sets promote inertia. To the con-
trary, expanding the choice set by adding more plans increases people’s likelihood 
of switching plans, unless the additional plans are high cost relative to the available 
206 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JANuARy 2015
alternatives. For example, we find that each additional plan available within $300 
of the individual’s minimum cost plan’s annual costs increases the likelihood of 
switching by 0.6 percentage points. The results also provide no evidence that larger 
choice sets inhibit individuals responsiveness to the costs of their status quo plans. 
This, too, is inconsistent with the choice overload hypothesis.
We extend these models to evaluate whether people became less responsive to their 
status quo plans’ costs over time. In these models, the net within-person change over 
time is identified as the net effect of the average conditional year-specific effects for 
2007–2010 and the average conditional effect of each additional month of experi-
ence. We define experience as the individual-specific number of months spent in the 
PDP market without a low-income subsidy. To minimize the influence of any other 
individual-specific factors that may covary with time and experience, these models 
include additional interaction terms. Specifically, the net effect of time is conditional 
on any effects that the individual’s age, total prescription drug spending, and diag-
nosis of Alzheimer’s disease or other dementia might have on their responsiveness 
to their status quo plan’s relative costs.
The results for the net within-person changes over time show that people were 
more responsive to high levels of status quo plans’ costs in 2008–2010 than they 
were in 2007. At the same time, they were also less responsive to low levels of their 
status quo plans’ costs in 2008–2009 than 2007. All of these differences from 2007 
mostly disappeared in 2010, with the notable exception being that people were still 
more likely in 2010 than 2007 to switch in response to large increases in their status 
quo plans’ costs in 2010. Underlying these net changes over time are two counter-
acting effects: whereas the results show overall increases in people’s responsiveness 
to their status quo plans’ costs for 2008–2010 relative to 2007, accruing greater 
individual-specific experience in the PDP market reduced this responsiveness.
Descriptive results complement this evidence from the empirical models. Among 
those enrolled for two consecutive full years without a low income subsidy, rates of 
switching between PDPs remained flat for 2008 through 2010, around one percent-
age point below the 11.7 percent level observed for 2007. Overall, only 50 percent 
of those who initially enrolled from January 2006 through December 2009 remained 
in their original PDP by January 2010. Among those who stayed in the PDP mar-
ket through 2010, 28 percent had previously switched between PDPs, generating 
a cumulative savings from switching among that population exceeding $1 billion.
In the next section we summarize the related literature on choice overload and 
experience and its expected implications for consumers’ decisions to switch PDPs. 
Section II provides a description of the CMS data, the methods used to measure the 
key variables and the trends in those variables from 2006–2010. Results regarding 
individuals’ switching decisions and choice overload are presented in Section III. 
The role of time in switching decisions is evaluated in Section IV. Section V provides 
the results from five alternative modeling approaches and Section VI concludes.
I. Relevance of Existing Research to Medicare Part D
Prior research has reported evidence for choice overload, whether from increasing 
the number of options from two to four in a laboratory experiment (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser 1988), or by several hundred as for mutual funds (Kempf and Ruenzi 
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2006).1 Related, Madrian and Shea (2001) found that in the context of 401(k) plans 
offered by an actual employer, automatic enrollment greatly amplified participant 
inertia. Specifically, they concluded that status quo bias resulted in the default 
option being chosen far more frequently simply as a result of being the default. That 
article did not evaluate how such effects varied with the number or types of options 
provided. Building on these results and on the work of Klemperer (1995), Speigler 
(2011) developed a theoretical model to demonstrate that increasing the number of 
options increases consumers’ status quo bias, resulting in greater price variation and 
suppliers’ profits.
Applications of this research to Medicare Part D have been widespread, with par-
ticular emphasis on the results of the experiments in Iyengar and Lepper (2000).2 
In Part D, the default option for nonparticipants is to continue not to participate. 
Likewise, the default for current enrollees during open enrollment is to remain in 
their status quo plans for the upcoming year. Additionally, the average number of 
available PDPs faced by individuals in 2006–2010 was 51, based on data described 
below. In contrast with the conclusions from Iyengar and Lepper (2000), however, 
satisfaction and participation in Part D both remain high, with 85 percent of par-
ticipants reporting satisfaction and 90 percent of the Medicare population enrolled 
in some form of creditable prescription drug coverage (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services 2008).3
The primary existing research supporting restrictions on consumer choice in Part D 
specifically is Abaluck and Gruber (2011, p. 1109) who conclude that, “consumers 
would be better off if there were less scope for choosing the wrong plan.” Their pro-
posed method of achieving this outcome is by constraining the number of insurance 
plans available to each person (Abaluck and Gruber 2009).4 Yet that research did not 
examine the effects of the number of available plans directly. Further, it evaluated 
only the first year of Part D when consumers had no experience in the newly created 
market and when the complementary information market was still being developed.
In the context of Part D, the important common prediction of the choice over-
load hypothesis is that expanding the number of options available to an individual, 
regardless of the added plans’ characteristics, will suppress the likelihood that she 
switches out of her status quo plan. Yet parallel research points out that not all avail-
able options will be considered by consumers. Specifically, plans that are dominated 
on costs may be viewed as irrelevant because their costs fall beyond the consumer’s 
budget constraint (as Kuminoff, Smith, and Timmins 2013 and Banzhaf and Smith 
2007 point out for housing markets), or because consumers eliminate them from 
their consideration to minimize search costs or cognitive processing costs (Stigler 
1961; Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990; Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2003). In the 
1 Tversky and Shafir (1992) and Iyengar and Lepper (2000) represent two other salient experimental examples.
2 For example, the Rhode Island Health Care Reform Commission in charge of designing the state’s health insur-
ance exchange stated that, “studies indicate that people are more likely to make a choice—and be satisfied with their 
choice—when they face a more limited set of choices,” citing Iyengar and Lepper (2000) and Iyengar, Huberman, 
and Jiang (2004) (Rhode Island Healthcare Reform Commission 2011).
3 Additional evidence for high participation levels in 2006 is provided in Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2006) 
and for 2009 in Neuman and Cubanski (2009). Additional evidence regarding consumers’ satisfaction with Part D 
is available from AARP (2007) and Medicare Today (2012).
4 For a sampling of health policy articles supporting restricted choice in Part D and in the state health insurance 
exchanges see Day and Nadash (2012); Mikels, Reed, and Simon (2009); Cummings, Rice, and Hanoch (2009); 
Tanius et al. (2009); Hoadley (2008); and Huskamp et al. (2000).
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Part D  context, budget constraints may rule out high cost options, as may “consid-
eration sets” that consumers use to avoid the costs of ascertaining information on 
other, more difficult to observe attributes such as variance reduction and plan qual-
ity. Thus, in contrast to the choice overload hypotheses, indiscriminately expanding 
the number of options may have no effect on switching decisions. If either bud-
get constraints or consideration sets influence consumers’ willingness or ability to 
evaluate plans but choice overload does not, then adding high cost options should 
have no effect on switching while adding attractive options may promote switching.
Extending beyond this hypothesized main effect of choice overload, we also con-
sider whether increasing the number of options causes consumers to become less 
responsive to the relative costs of their status quo plans.5 As with the hypothesized 
main effect, the choice overload hypothesis proposes that the effects of expanded 
choice sets on consumers’ responsiveness to their costs would exist regardless of the 
relative costs of the additional plans. Due to such concerns, in 2008 and 2009 CMS 
became more active in denying insurers’ applications to sell plans that were viewed 
as too similar to other plans already sold by the same firm.6
In contrast with the subset of studies that have been commonly applied to Part D, 
the analysis by Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd (2010) demonstrates that the 
studies of Iyengar and Lepper (2000) represent outliers, with 50 experiments pro-
viding no evidence overall that more options affect satisfaction and purchasing deci-
sions.7 Instead, they conclude that the existing research demonstrates that “more 
choice is better if decision makers had well-defined preferences prior to choice” 
(Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd 2010, p. 421). Given this condition, it is 
notable that Iyengar and Lepper (2000, p. 996) state that they intentionally chose 
participants who would “not already have strong specific preferences” for products 
or product attributes. Additionally, evidence of choice overload has not been found 
consistently even in contexts in which people lack substantial prior knowledge about 
the products.8
Further contrasting with the predictions of choice overload in Part D is a recent 
set of experiments on retirement home residents’ choices. Specifically, Besedeš et 
al. (2012, p. 525) evaluated the effects of expanding the choice set from 4 to 8 to 
12 options for a product that “can be thought of as health insurance or drug coverage 
plans.” The results showed that expanding the choice set improved people’s choices, 
and these improvements were larger when the set expanded from 8 to 12 options 
than from 4 to 8 options. Importantly for our context, the study demonstrated that 
5 As an example from the health policy literature, Tanius et al. (2009) used a laboratory experiment to conclude 
that, “individuals have a more difficult time choosing the best option when faced with large number of prescription 
drug plans than when faced with few.” Bundorf and Szrek (2010) implemented an experimental evaluation of choice 
set size in Part D. They concluded that consumers’ benefits and costs increased with choice set size, but they did not 
evaluate the effects of choice set size on switching plans.
6 As evidence of the stated motivation for this change, the 2008 Call Letter stated, “CMS will negotiate with 
[PDP] sponsors to ensure that each bid they submit represents a meaningful variation based on plan characteristics 
that will provide beneficiaries with substantially different options. … We expect that organizations will take steps to 
ensure that the array of PDP benefit packages submitted can be reasonably understood and compared by beneficia-
ries in terms of key plan characteristics” (our emphasis added) (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2007).
7 In preceding work, Scheibehenne (2008) was unable to replicate the results from the original Iyengar and 
Lepper (2000) jam study in Germany.
8 For additional discussion of this and other ancillary conditions for choice overload, see Scheibehenne, 
Greifeneder, and Todd (2010); Chernev, Böckenholt, and Goodman (2010); and Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and 
Todd (2011).
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these gains resulted primarily from larger choice sets prompting people to rely more 
heavily on heuristics to find the options that were best for them. Specifically, the 
authors concluded that “increasing the number of options in a decision problem 
increases the number of heuristics brought to the task. This challenges the choice 
overload view that people give up when confronted with too much choice” (p. 524).
Also relevant for considering choice overload in Part D are the conclusions of 
Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd (2010) that these null effects are independent 
of the size of the choice set. That is, they find no evidence of nonlinear effects of 
adding options to the choice set, as summarized in their Figure 2. As a result, we 
expect that any effects of choice overload observed under the range of the number of 
plans available in Part D through 2010 should also apply to much smaller or larger 
choice sets. It is conceivable that the lack of nonlinearities in these experimental 
results does not apply to Part D such that choice overload would be evident at much 
smaller choice set sizes but not at the level of choice set sizes that existed in Part D 
for 2006 through 2010. In this case, then we should expect that changes in choice 
set size within our study sample should have no effect on switching rates, and this 
null effect should be evident regardless of whether the incremental plans are low or 
high cost.
Regarding the effects of experience, prior research has shown that an individual’s 
likelihood of switching products declines as they gain experience with the product 
category. This effect has been found in markets for frequently purchased and uti-
lized goods such as laundry detergent (Osborne 2011) and diapers and baby towels 
(Heilman, Bowman, and Wright 2000), for far less frequently purchased goods such 
as personal computers (Prince 2011), and for services purchased annually but less 
frequently utilized such as automobile insurance (Israel 2005a). The precise mecha-
nisms underlying this positive relationship between inertia and experience differ 
across theoretical models and empirical contexts, but they rely on some combina-
tion of increasing switching costs and asymmetric learning. Switching costs arise 
as consumers make investments in the specific product that they have been purchas-
ing, where those investments do not carry over to the alternatives. Such switching 
costs may arise from psychological factors or economic factors such as asymmetric 
learning. Asymmetric learning occurs as consumers gain knowledge of their sta-
tus quo via their experiences but do not gain knowledge regarding the alternatives 
(Klemperer 1995; Osborne 2011; Prince 2011).9, 10
Other related evidence, however, suggests that consumers’ abilities to navigate 
through such new and growing information markets may themselves grow with 
experience (Miravete 2003; List 2003, 2004, and 2006; and List and Millimet 
2008). In Part D, if experience promotes consumers’ ability to find better-matching 
plans, then we would expect people over time to become more likely to switch away 
from their status quo plans due to lower search costs (Prince 2011). In  contrast, if a 
9 An example of this is evident even in the seminal paper on status quo bias by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988, 
p. 37) which states, “Assuming that he or she understands his or her current plan, a reasonable strategy would be to 
undertake a comparative analysis including only some subset of competing plans (ignoring the others altogether). 
Thus, the status quo alternative gains a decision advantage by virtue of the asymmetric position it holds in the deci-
sion reckoning.”
10 Some of this existing research evaluates and finds that inertia increases with tenure in the status quo plan rather 
than with experience in the market per se. This focus is partly due to data limitations that allowed the researchers to 
observe only individuals’ tenure at a single firm and not the total extent of their market participation.
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person’s switching costs or asymmetric learning grow over time, then we expect she 
would become more likely to remain in her status quo plan. As a second order effect, 
experience may also enhance or dampen how responsive people are to changes in the 
relative costs of their status quo plans. Consistent with the prediction that switching 
costs would dominate, Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2010, p. 474) concluded that, 
“there is a lock-in effect, and so it may have been a good strategy for plan providers 
in this repeated-interaction market to offer cheap plans in the first period and then to 
increase premiums and/or reduce plan quality over time.”
Like automobile insurance studied by Israel (2005a, b), PDPs are purchased annu-
ally and may have economic switching costs and asymmetric learning that increase 
with experience. In Part D such switching costs may exist from factors such as prior 
authorization requirements for certain drugs or from the hassle costs of establish-
ing new mail order prescriptions. Regarding asymmetric learning, Part D enrollees 
frequently file claims, unlike auto insurance, potentially facilitating rapid learning 
about dimensions such as the plan-specific formulary and the quality of customer 
support. On the other hand, some measures of this information are readily available 
from sources including the CMS online “plan finder” that facilitates consumers’ 
ability to compare plans. Because of the presence of these sources of information 
about the alternatives, the role of asymmetric learning in Part D may be minimal. 
The link between asymmetric knowledge about the status quo and experience may 
also be weak in Part D: CMS requires plans to notify all of their existing enrollees, 
regardless of experience levels, of any upcoming changes in their premiums, deduct-
ibles, or formulary coverage, including providing a list of specific drugs that will be 
dropped from the formulary. Presumably this type of statutorily established infor-
mational asymmetry may be whittled down by firms’ marketing efforts and by the 
provision of information by intermediaries. On balance, these institutional details 
suggest that the effects of experience in Part D might diverge from the previously 
studied contexts where experience has been shown to inhibit switching.
II. Data and Descriptive Results
A. Part D Plan Turnover Rates
Our study combines several rich data sources for 2006–2010 available only 
from CMS. We begin with the 20 percent sample of Medicare beneficiaries, which 
is defined as everyone enrolled in Medicare with a randomly assigned Medicare 
Beneficiary Identity Code that ends with 0 or 5 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services 2014a). To assess the overall level of PDPs’ enrollee turnover rates, we cre-
ate a variable from the Master Beneficiary Summary-Base (A/B/D) files (Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2014c, née the CMS Enhanced Denominator 
File) that indicates whether each person who started in a PDP without a low-income 
subsidy was still in the same PDP at the beginning of the following year.11 This 
11 Due to plan terminations and consolidations, determining whether a person remained in their initial plan is 
more complex than simply comparing whether the individual had the same contract and plan ID in the subsequent 
year. We relied on the CMS Plan Information Files (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2011) and the 
CMS Plan Crosswalk Files that tracks evolution in a given plan’s contract and plan IDs across years to provide an 
accurate measure of whether the individual was in the same plan over time. Prior to our analysis, the crosswalk files 
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 variable shows the extent to which enrollees are inert from the plans’ perspectives. 
Low turnover rates would indicate that plans may have substantial opportunity to 
harvest gains from incumbent enrollees but also substantial incentive to compete for 
initial enrollment decisions (Dube, Hitsch, and Rossi 2009).
Table 1 reports the overall turnover rates separately by year in which the individual 
enrolled in any PDP without a low-income subsidy for the first time. Among those 
who first enrolled in a PDP at any point in 2006, 19 percent were no longer enrolled 
in their initial plans by January 2007. This climbed to 33 percent by January 2008, 
44 by 2009, and 53 percent were no longer enrolled in their initial PDP at the begin-
ning of 2010.12 Similar trends, but with higher turnover levels, are found among 
those who started in 2007, 2008, and 2009. Within, at most, 12 months of their ini-
tial PDP choice, 26 percent of those who started in 2007, 25 percent of those starting 
in 2008, and 33 percent of those starting in 2009 had already transitioned out of their 
original PDPs.13 Retention rates continued to fall over time so that, by the beginning 
of 2010, across all four of these cohorts almost exactly half (50.1 percent) were no 
longer enrolled in their original PDP.
B. The Cost Calculator
The remainder of this article focuses on individuals’ decisions to switch between 
PDPs. Hence we restrict our analysis to those who were enrolled for the entire year 
in a single PDP, did not receive a low-income subsidy at any point in the year, were 
age 65 or higher and alive at the end of the year, did not live in a US territory outside 
of the 50 states or District of Columbia, and did not have a duplicate entry in any 
year of the enrollment files. For these individuals, we observe whether they switched 
between PDPs during each open enrollment period or whether they remained in 
their status quo PDP.
were incomplete and were not developed for conducting longitudinal research. For example, the crosswalks some-
times indicated that a plan was renewed by CMS at the request of the insurer, but the insurer subsequently chose 
not to offer that plan. In such cases, the plans do not appear in the latter year’s Plan Information File, indicating that 
it was a terminated plan despite the existing crosswalk file’s indication that the plan was renewed. We implement 
logic that capitalizes on all information available in these two files to develop accurate measures of true switching 
as distinct from non-switching that occurred from mergers or “forced switching” that occurred from terminations. 
Our efforts created the Part D Plan Crosswalk Extract file used internally within CMS and now available to external 
researchers.
12 The 47 percent who remained in their original plan includes those who were still in the same PDP but acquired 
low-income subsidy status in the interim. We exclude those who had a low-income subsidy at the outset because 
many of them were assigned to a PDP by CMS and did not choose a plan for themselves.
13 These non-retention rates include those who left PDPs for various reasons, including death. This is distinct 
from the measure of switching between PDPs that we use in our empirical analysis, as described below.
Table 1—Share of People No Longer Enrolled in Their Original Plan  
at the Beginning of Each Subsequent Year
2007 2008 2009 2010
Among nonpoor PDP enrollees who started in 
 2006 18.8 32.8 44.0 53.0
 2007 — 26.2 42.6 53.8
 2008 — — 24.8 42.1
 2009 — — — 33.0
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One of our central measures of interest is the cost of the individual’s status quo 
plan relative to the available alternatives. To define this we develop and implement 
a cost calculator that estimates what each person would have spent in each PDP 
available in her region in each year. This cost calculator is based on institutional 
knowledge and datasets existing within CMS. It incorporates every aspect of every 
plan that determines individuals’ total out-of-pocket (OOP) costs. These include the 
plans’ formularies and cost sharing structure by pharmacy type; the deductible; cov-
erage of drugs in each phase—below the deductible, below the initial coverage limit, 
within the gap, and above the catastrophic coverage limit; free first-fill; whether the 
plan covers statutorily excluded drugs not reimbursed by CMS; and the underlying 
plan-specific drug prices, which we calculate using the universe (100 percent) of 
claims from the Prescription Drug Event (PDE) data for each year.14, 15
We apply this cost calculator to the PDE file that lists every drug claim sub-
mitted on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries, including drug identifiers, date 
filled, gross price, amount paid by the insurer, patient OOP cost, and formulary 
tier (available only from the research-identifiable file, Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services 2014d), plus the pharmacy type (merged on from the Pharmacy 
Characteristics File). By using the claims for each person in the order they were 
filled, this cost calculator estimates each individual’s annual OOP drug spending 
in each available plan for each year. We measure the total OOP cost of each plan 
for each person in each year by adding the consumer’s annual premiums for each 
plan from the premium file within the Part D Plan Characteristics Files to the cal-
culated OOP drug spending.16 We denote this measure of total OOP cost as  C ijt 
for individual i from choosing plan j that belongs to her choice set in year t. We 
utilize the distribution across plans for a given person and year to determine the 
difference between the actual chosen plan and the minimum-cost plan, defined as 
 C it − mi n j { C ijt }, where  C it is the actual chosen plan in year t. This is the realized 
“above minimum spending.”17 Likewise for analysis of switching decisions we 
define  A it =  C i j t−1 t − mi n j { C ijt }. We refer to  A it as “the individual’s relative cost of 
staying in her status quo plan” or similar to indicate that this is defined as what she 
would spend without switching, relative to her lowest cost alternative.
We validate the accuracy of this cost calculator by comparing each individual’s 
actual out-of-pocket (OOP) costs, observed by CMS, with the OOP costs that we 
calculate for the actual plan, finding correlation coefficients for the two ranging 
from 0.98 in 2009 to 0.92 in 2006 and 2007.18 This high level of accuracy of 
14 This highly detailed information on each plan’s design is found in the CMS Part D Plan Characteristics Files, 
which are based on administrative data used to review and approve plans (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services 2014a). For example, these files provide the OOP price for every formulary tier, phase, and drug which are 
key inputs to our cost calculator, as discussed further in the online Appendix. There we also provide details about 
the development of the plan-specific total drug prices.
15 For the analysis we utilized the internal CMS data. The majority of this information is available to academic 
researchers through the Research Identifiable Files, however.
16 To ensure consistency across every plan in each person’s choice set, we use the calculated OOP costs even for 
the actual plan.
17 We do not intend the term above-minimum spending to carry any normative implications. Instead we use it 
to convey that this variable is concerned with only the total OOP amount that the consumer could have saved by 
choosing her minimum-cost plan.
18 By comparison, the cost calculator used in Ketcham et al. (2012) yielded correlations of only 0.80 in 2006 and 
0.77 in 2007. The current cost calculator yields a few cases where the calculated gross spending in the actual plan 
widely deviates from the actual gross spending. We eliminate these individuals from all years of the data if in any 
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the cost calculator comes from our ability to incorporate information and insti-
tutional knowledge held within CMS that were only partially incorporated into 
previous cost calculators (Abaluck and Gruber 2011; Ketcham et al. 2012). For 
example, this includes our ability to generate accurate underlying plan-specific 
prices, where the cost calculator of Ketcham et al. (2012) relied on a third-party 
data source (formerly Wolters Kluwer Health, now Symphony Health Solutions) 
to generate these  plan-specific prices. The cost calculator of Abaluck and Gruber 
(2011) held a given drug’s price constant across all plans. Yet allowing drug prices 
to vary across plans matters substantially, with an average within-person range in 
total drug spending (the sum of OOP and other payers’ spending), holding drug 
consumption constant and only allowing the plans’ drug prices to vary, of $635 
and an average standard deviation in gross drug spending across plans for a given 
person-year of $173. This contrasts with the calculator developed in Abaluck and 
Gruber (2011) which imposes $0 variance across plans in gross spending for a 
given person in a given year.
As another specific example of the types of improvements incorporated into this 
cost calculator, we built into it precise information about gap coverage. In the public 
use files, gap coverage is presented as a categorical variable. In reality, however, 
even plans with gap coverage tremendously differ in the extent of coverage in the 
gap, e.g., some formulary tiers are covered at certain rates in the gap while other 
tiers may have less or no coverage. We accessed the open text fields provided by 
the plans themselves to allow the cost calculator to accurately assign each plan’s 
specific cost-sharing rules in the gap for every drug.19
Several modeling decisions are required to implement this cost calculator. First, 
as analysts we do not know the quantities or mix of prescriptions each person would 
have filled in her available but unchosen plans, e.g., due to differences from the 
actual plan in demand-side (OOP prices) or supply side (e.g., prior authorization 
requirements) cost controls, or due to differences in pharmacy networks or hassle 
of getting claims paid. We adopt two different approaches. First, for a given person 
and year, we hold the drugs constant across every plan in the choice set. We refer 
to this approach as the “perfectly inelastic” method. Second, we alter the gross and 
OOP spending to account for price elasticity of demand for drugs. In that approach 
we rely on the average elasticity for Medicare enrollees of −0.54 estimated by Shea 
et al. (2007).20
The second decision that analysts face regards how to measure the information 
that consumers use to form their expectations about the upcoming year. The context 
of Part D plan choice incorporates uncertainty about future prescription drug use. 
In our main approach we use the prescriptions filled in the next year, i.e., the year 
for which the individual is making an enrollment decision. The models of switching 
that we implement relying on this approach evaluate consumers’ sensitivity to the 
single year the dollar difference between their calculated and actual spending as well as the ratio of these two gross 
spending measures both fall below the 0.1 or above the 99.9 percentile for the year. Investigating the underlying 
causes of these outliers showed that they were typically due to implausible units dispensed on one claim.
19 This was required for 2006 only, as in later years this information was embedded within the Research 
Identifiable File Tier Characteristics Table available to researchers. These details are embedded within the cost 
calculator code accompanying this article and available through the journal’s website.
20 A more extended consideration of these issues is provided in the Appendix of Ketcham et al. (2012).
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actual, realized costs of their status quo plan relative to the lowest cost plan in the 
upcoming year. We refer to this as the ex post approach. To assess the importance of 
these key assumptions for our primary results, we also allow for two different pos-
sibilities. These are the ex ante or “plan finder” approach and the “rational expecta-
tions” approach as described in Section V below.
C. Trends in Spending, Switching, and Savings from Switching
The first row of Table 2 reports the total OOP spending in each year as a first 
measure of how nonpoor PDP enrollees fared over time. The results show a large 
reduction in individuals’ average total OOP costs from 2006 to 2007, amounting to 
an average decrease of $208. These reductions continued and OOP spending fell 
another $71 in 2008 before climbing in both 2009 and 2010, albeit remaining about 
$100 below the 2006 levels.
The remainder of Table 2 reports the trends in the OOP cost of the individual’s 
minimum-cost plan(s) and the trend in above-minimum spending. Because these 
measures may be sensitive to the assumed price elasticity of demand for drugs, we 
report them first using the assumption that prescription drug demand is perfectly 
inelastic, and second assuming an elasticity of −0.54. As with total OOP spending, 
the OOP spending under the minimum-cost plan fell each year from 2006–2008 
before climbing in both 2009 and 2010.
The net effect of these two trends is captured in the above-minimum OOP spend-
ing measures. Above-minimum spending fell sharply from 2006–2007, similar to 
the results in Ketcham et al. (2012). Under the assumption of perfectly inelastic 
demand, above-minimum spending fell by $173 (33 percent). Above-minimum 
spending fell by another $54 in 2008, yielding a value equal to only 56 percent of 
the 2006 level. Above-minimum spending climbed in 2009 but plateaued at $329 in 
2010, still $191 (37 percent) below the 2006 level and also below the 2007 level. 
The trend under the assumption of elastic demand is highly similar, albeit with lower 
levels of above-minimum spending and thus also smaller changes over time. Under 
both approaches, above-minimum spending as a percent of total OOP spending was 
at its lowest levels in 2010, matching the lows near 20 percent achieved in 2008.
Table 2—Trends in Out-of-Pocket Spending  
and Above-Minimum Spending among Nonpoor PDP Enrollees, 2006–2010
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total OOP spending on premiums and prescription drugs ($) 1,590 1,382 1,312 1,435 1,492
Year to year percent change in OOP spending — −13.1 −5.1 9.4 3.9
Percent change in OOP spending relative to 2006 — −13.1 −17.5 −9.7 −6.2
Ex post approach with perfectly inelastic demand for drugs
OOP Spending in minimum-cost plan ($) 1,070 1,036 1,019 1,104 1,163
Above-minimum OOP spending ($) 520 347 292 331 329
Above-minimum OOP spending as percent of total OOP (%) 33 25 22 23 22
Ex post approach with price elasticity of demand for drugs of −0.54
OOP Spending in minimum-cost plan ($) 1,235 1,145 1,078 1,153 1,217
Above-minimum OOP spending ($) 355 237 234 282 275
Above-minimum OOP spending as percent of total OOP (%) 22 17 18 20 18
Note: OOP is out-of-pocket. 
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To analyze switching decisions, we further limit the sample to those who met the 
cost calculator criteria for two consecutive years. This ensures that we are compar-
ing two similar sequential open enrollment decisions for full-year non-low-income 
subsidy coverage because people are likely to make different choices for part-year 
versus full-year and subsidized versus unsubsidized coverage in ways that would 
affect switching. Through this restriction and the fact that no switching could occur 
for 2006, our sample consists of 1,512,275 individuals making 3,960,499 switch-
ing decisions, with 433,154 for 2007; 1,141,521 for 2008; 1,183,741 for 2009; and 
1,202,083 for 2010. The overall rate of switching between PDPs among those who 
stayed enrolled in a PDP and did not acquire a low-income subsidy is reported in 
the first row of Table 3. This rate was 11.7 percent for 2007, fell by nearly one per-
centage point in 2008, and then remained virtually flat at just under 11 percentage 
points through 2010.21 By comparison, switching rates between nonpoor individu-
als’ initial, partial year of enrollment and their first full year of enrollment were 
notably higher in almost every year, at 8.5 percent for 2007, 22.1 percent for 2008, 
17.6 percent for 2009, and 25.3 percent for 2010.
With this set of switching decisions, we rely on the cost calculator to measure 
how much each individual saved as a result of switching. For someone who chose 
to switch, this is the difference between her total OOP spending in her new plan and 
what her OOP spending would have been if she had stayed in her status quo plan, 
i.e.,  C it −  C i j  t−1  t where  C i j  t−1  t denotes the OOP spending in year t if the person stayed 
in her plan from year t − 1. Because this is a within-person, within-year compari-
son, it eliminates the effects on OOP spending of all time-varying and time-invariant 
individual-specific effects including health.
As reported in Table 3, the mean and median savings from switching exceed $100 
in each year. These savings increased sharply from 2007–2008 and remained high 
in 2009. They declined in 2010 but still remained above the 2007 levels. These sav-
ings accrued to a large majority of those who switched plans, with positive savings 
for 77–88 percent of them for 2008–2010. These levels are also above 2007, dur-
ing which 65–66 percent of switchers achieved lower OOP spending as a result of 
switching.22
One concern with these overall trends is that the changes in the population enrolled 
in PDPs over time may mask the average within-person trends. To isolate the aver-
age within-person change over time in these trends, we evaluate the subsample that 
began on January 1, 2006 and remained in the PDP market without a low-income 
subsidy through the end of 2010. This population is of particular interest because 
they accrue the most experience in Part D, providing greater ability to evaluate how 
inertia changes over time.
Table 4 reports this sample’s trends in spending, above-minimum spending, 
switch ing and savings from switching. Switching rates among this sample were 
highest in 2010, more than 2 percentage points above their 2009 level and nearly 
21 These switching rates are below the overall retention rates reported above because this is restricted to only 
PDPs’ enrollees decisions to switch PDPs during open enrollment between two full years of enrollment in any PDP. 
This eliminates everyone who left the nonpoor PDP market for various reasons, including acquiring a low-income 
subsidy, death, and switching to other types of plans.
22 It is worth noting that these results are based on a demanding analytical standard, as it compares individuals’ 
ex post realized costs in two different plans.
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half a  percentage point higher than in 2007. Mean above-minimum spending in 
2010 remained $153 below its 2006 level and even just below its 2007 level. As with 
the full sample,  above-minimum spending climbed from 2008 to 2009, although in 
percentage terms, above-minimum spending was lowest in 2010. These trends sug-
gest inertia did not increase over time among this cohort, where these time trends 
incorporate the effects of individual-specific experience and the overall changes to 
the market.
To consider additional dynamic aspects of savings from switching, we also estab-
lish counterfactual measures for the spending people would have incurred if they 
stayed in their initially chosen plan for the remainder of their time in the PDP market. 
This approach allows for savings from switching to accrue to the individual in years 
even beyond the single year following the switch itself. As shown in Table 5, under 
the inelastic approach, by 2010 the average annual OOP savings by those who ever 
switched was $233, yielding actual OOP spending 13 percent below what it would 
have been without any switching. The estimated cumulative savings from switching 
between PDPs for 2007–2010 exceeds $1.3 billion, equivalent to 13 percent of the 
actual cumulative spending by PDP enrollees. Similar patterns with slightly lower 
magnitudes are observed under the alternative approach of allowing the demand for 
drugs to be somewhat elastic.23
23 These values are calculated for those who switched between two full years of enrollment. As such it represents 
an underestimate of the true total savings because savings also accrue to those enrolled for only a partial year.
Table 3—Switching and Savings from Switching, 2007–2010
2007 2008 2009 2010
Switched between PDPs from the prior year (%) 11.7 10.9 10.6 10.7
Ex post approach with perfectly inelastic demand for drugs
 Mean savings from switching ($) 178 256 254 206
 Median savings from switching ($) 132 223 222 154
 Percent that saved >$0 from switching (%) 66.1 81.7 86.2 77.4
Ex post approach with price elasticity of demand for drugs of −0.54
 Mean savings from switching ($) 102 194 195 144
 Median savings from switching ($) 101 158 180 112
 Percent that saved >$0 from switching 65.1 82.7 88.0 80.9
Notes: OOP is out-of-pocket. All values are from the sample that was enrolled in a single PDP without a  low-income 
subsidy for the entire prior year.
Table 4—Spending, Above-Minimum Spending, and Switching among the 2006–2010 Cohort
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Switched PDPs from prior year (%) — 11.4 11.6  9.6 11.8
Total OOP spending on premiums and prescription drugs ($) 1,519 1,504 1,438 1,597 1,691
OOP spending in minimum-cost plan ($) 1,006 1,138 1,115 1,238 1,331
Above-minimum OOP spending ($) 514 367 324 359 360
Above-minimum OOP spending as percent of total OOP (%) 33.8 24.4 22.5 22.5 21.3
Notes: OOP is out-of-pocket. The sample is restricted to the 306,315 that began in the PDP market without a 
low-income subsidy on January 1, 2006 and remained enrolled in a PDP without a low-income subsidy through 
December 31, 2010. Minimum and above-minimum spending are defined using the ex post approach and assuming 
perfectly inelastic demand for drugs. 
217ketcham et al.: paying attention or paying too muchVol. 105 no. 1
D. Variables for Number of Plans and Experience
We rely on two distinct measures of the number of plans to evaluate the role 
of choice overload in people’s switching decisions. First, we use the total number 
of plans available in the region regardless of their relative costs to the individual. 
This is measured by counting the number of unique plan IDs listed for PDPs (and 
excluding employer plans) offered in each region and each year.24 Second, we use 
the results from the cost calculator to count the number of plans by their relative 
costs. We define this as the number of plans that are within $100 of the person’s 
 minimum-cost plan, within $100–$200 of the minimum, $200–$300, $300–$400, 
$400–$500, and more than $500. In contrast with the overall plan count, which 
is defined at the region level, this is an individual-specific variable with variation 
across individuals within a given region and year.
Table 6 reports the overall number of plans and the number of plans by relative 
cost category using the ex post approach. To streamline the presentation of results, 
here we report only the count by cost assuming a price elasticity of demand for 
drugs of −0.54. Consistent with the change in enforcement announced by CMS 
for 2008 described above, the strong surge in the number of plans available in 2007 
was followed by a decline in 2008. This decline continued through 2010, dropping 
from a high of 56 in 2007 to 50 in 2009 and to 46 in 2010. These declines from 
2007–2010 appear concentrated among the lower cost categories, with the largest 
24 Employer plans are not available to people who were not employees of the particular firm.
Table 5—Cumulative Switching and Savings from Switching, 2007–2010
2007 2008 2009 2010
Percent of current enrollees that have ever  
 previously switched between PDPs (%)
11.7 16.9 23.1 27.6
Actual OOP spending by those who ever  
 previously switched ($)
1,882 1,480 1,500 1,540
Ex post approach with perfectly inelastic  
 demand for drugs
 OOP spending if stayed in original plan  
  and never switched ($)
2,062 1,687 1,725 1,773
 Annual savings by current enrollees who ever  
  previously switched ($)
180 207 225 233
 Savings as a percent of total OOP spending (%) 9.6 14.0 15.0 15.1
 Total non-subsidy PDP full year enrollees 7,462,806 7,743,191 7,790,845 7,787,562
 Annual savings from cumulative switching ($) 157,306,398 271,298,803 405,055,147 500,802,537
 Total cumulative savings from switching ($) 157,306,398 428,605,201 833,660,347 1,334,462,885
Ex post approach with price elasticity of  
 demand for drugs of −0.54
 OOP spending if stayed in original plan  
  and never switched ($)
1,987 1,650 1,686 1,734
 Annual savings by current enrollees who ever  
  previously switched ($)
105 170 186 194
 Savings as a percent of total OOP spending (%) 5.6 11.5 12.4 12.6
 Total non-subsidy PDP full year enrollees 7,462,806 7,743,191 7,790,845 7,787,562
 Annual savings from cumulative switching ($) 91,820,275 222,880,629 334,867,424 416,977,220
 Total cumulative savings from switching ($) 91,820,275 314,700,905 649,568,329 1,066,545,549
Note: OOP is out-of-pocket.
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percent reductions in the two lowest cost categories (35 percent). In contrast, the 
highest cost category saw an increase in the number of plans over that period. The 
last two columns of this table show the averages of the minimums, maximums, and 
within-person ranges of these variables. This is important because our identification 
for empirically testing the choice overload hypothesis relies on such within-person 
variation.
The final main variable of interest is experience. We define this as the cumula-
tive number of months with coverage in a PDP without a low-income subsidy. We 
eliminate time in a PDP with a low-income subsidy for two reasons. First, such 
enrollees are auto-assigned to a benchmark plan and thus may not have any experi-
ence searching for plans. Second, the OOP cost-sharing structure for on-formulary 
drugs is substantially different when a person has a low-income subsidy, so that such 
experience likely has little informative value to consumers. We analyze the effects 
of total experience in the PDP market rather than the tenure in the status quo plan. 
Much of the prior research from other contexts used the cumulative time in the sta-
tus quo because the available data did not permit the authors to observe total time 
in the market. Given that we can observe total experience here, we rely on it exclu-
sively because tenure in the status quo plan is endogenous, as discussed extensively 
in Israel (2005b).25 The average experience of our study sample climbed each year, 
beginning with exactly 12 months for everyone in the 2007 sample, to 21 months in 
2008, 31 months in 2009, and 40 months in 2010.
E. Demographics, Health, and Other Variables
We link on several CMS datasets to determine each individual’s characteristics 
at each point in time. The individual’s region, age (held constant as age at the end 
of 2010), sex, and race (defined using the Research Triangle Institute methodol-
ogy developed by Eicheldinger and Bonito 2008) are provided from the Beneficiary 
Summary File (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2014b). Measures of 
25 The number of months in the status quo plan and the total months of experience in the PDP market have a 
correlation coefficient of 0.88.
Table 6—Average Number of Prescription Drug Plans Available to the Study Sample,  
Overall and by Individual-Specific Relative Cost Categories
            Average within-person
Overall 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Minimum Maximum
Total stand-alone plans available 51.1 43.1 55.8 54.5 50.2 47.1 46.3 55.3
Number of plans available within
 $100 of minimum 4.8 3.0 6.2 5.8 4.0 4.0 2.2 8.2
 $100–200 of minimum 8.8 4.4 11.3 10.6 7.6 7.3 4.6 13.6
 $200–300 of minimum 10.4 6.5 12.6 10.8 10.4 9.3 6.3 14.5
 $300–400 of minimum 8.6 7.2 10.0 8.9 8.4 7.6 5.2 12.1
 $400–500 of minimum 5.5 6.2 5.8 5.2 5.6 5.4 2.9 8.6
 >$500 of minimum 13.0 16.0 9.8 13.2 14.3 13.5 7.6 19.4
Notes: The set of available prescription drug plans excludes employer-sponsored plans because those are not open 
to those not employed by the firm. The count by category of relative costs are from the ex post version assuming a 
price elasticity of demand for drugs of −0.54.
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each individual’s health are provided through the Beneficiary Annual Summary File 
(BASF), from which we measure the total reimbursement (defined as the sum of 
what Medicare paid, what the individual paid, and what any secondary insurers paid) 
for the beneficiary for hospital inpatient stays, for physician services, and for all 
other non-Part D spending (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2014a). 
Other health controls we incorporate from the BASF are the number of hospital 
inpatient admissions, outpatient visits, skilled nursing facility days, and physician 
office visits. Additionally, the Chronic Condition Data Warehouse (CCW) provides 
indicator variables for 21 different clinical indications for 2005–2010, which we 
collapse into 16 different categories (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
2014a).26 The list of illnesses and their prevalence by year are presented in the online 
Appendix, as are the means of the other variables used but not reported elsewhere in 
this article.
III. Switching and Choice Overload
In this section we evaluate the role of choice overload in explaining individuals’ 
switching decisions. Our approach relies on the within-person variation over time in 
the number of plans available to her. Our specific objectives are to determine how 
individual decisions to switch plans depend on the individual’s relative costs from 
remaining in the status quo plan and the number of available plans. That is, we eval-
uate two pathways by which choice overload may increase inertia. To accomplish 
this we estimate linear probability models of the form
(1)   S it =  θ t +  θ i +  α 1  A it +  α 2  N it +  α 3  H it +  u it , 
where  S it equals 100 if the individual switched for year t and 0 otherwise,  θ t corre-
spond to year fixed effects,  θ i is an individual-specific time invariant unobservable, 
A it is the person’s above-minimum spending in units of $100 if she remains in her 
status quo plan and  H it represents time-varying measures of the individual’s health 
as described in Section II. In the first specification,  N it is the number of plans avail-
able in the region and year. In the second specification, it is a vector of variables 
that count how many plans are within each category of OOP spending relative to the 
minimum-cost plan, as listed above. The coefficients on these main effects for  N it 
test the prediction of choice overload that larger choice sets will inhibit switching. 
To account for the fact that the number of available plans is determined at the region-
year level, we estimate every model using the cluster-robust variance estimator clus-
tered at the region-year level (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008). We implement 
this linear specification as opposed to index models such as logit or probit due to the 
incidental parameters problem first reported by Neyman and Scott (1948).27
26 The CCW methodology utilizes peer-reviewed research to identify specific ICD-9, CPT4, and HCPCS codes 
indicating the presence of a diagnosis for each condition, as described online, http://www.ccwdata.org/chronic-con-
ditions/index.htm. The CCW creates these indicators by using information from the individual’s Medicare Part A 
and Part B claims.
27 This has been studied further by Nerlove (1967, 1971), Heckman (1981), Abrevaya (1997), Katz (2001), and 
Greene (2004). This problem makes both the fixed effects and the parameters of the index inconsistent in those 
models when the individual heterogeneity is left completely unrestricted. Although it is possible to estimate fixed 
effects logit models with an unrestricted distribution of the unobserved characteristics, we see two drawbacks 
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To this base model we add an interaction term to provide a test of the second order 
prediction about how choice overload affects individuals’ decisions to switch plans. 
Specifically, we estimate linear probability models
(2)   S it =  θ t +  θ i +  α 1  A it +  α 2  N it +  α 3  H it +  α 4  A it ×  N it +  u it .
The interaction term  A it ×  N it provides a test whether adding more options decreases 
individuals’ responsiveness to changes in the above-minimum spending they would 
incur if they remain in their status quo plans.
Table 7 shows the results from these models from the ex post elastic version. 
The results from alternative modeling approaches are reported in Section V. Across 
all four models, the relative cost of the status quo plan in the upcoming year influ-
ences individuals’ switching decisions. Specifically, each additional $100 of 
 above-minimum spending by remaining in the status quo plan increases the condi-
tional probability of switching by 2.9–4.0 percentage points.
 relative to the linear probability model. First, it can only be estimated on individuals with variation in the switching 
variable, i.e., those who switched in at least one year but not every year. This is a nonrepresentative sample and 
would yield overestimates of the true marginal effects of the independent variables. Second, obtaining the marginal 
effects of interest requires further assumptions about the value of the unobserved effects, which defeats the purpose 
of leaving that distribution unrestricted.
Table 7—Parameter Estimates from Models of Switching Prescription Drug Plans, 2007–2010
Number of plans overall Number of plans by cost
No interactions Interactions No interactions Interactions
Above-minimum spending if stay in status  
 quo plan ($100s)
2.88 [0.39]*** 4.99 [2.16]** 4.03 [0.48]*** 6.80 [2.04]***
Number of available plans 0.39 [0.31] 0.50 [0.34]
Above-minimum spending if stay ($100s) 
 × number of available plans
−0.04 [0.04]
Number of available plans within
 $100 of minimum 0.60 [0.25]** 0.90 [0.31]***
 $100–200 of minimum 0.61 [0.28]** 0.60 [0.31]*
 $200–300 of minimum 0.54 [0.26]** 0.43 [0.30]
 $300–400 of minimum 0.41 [0.24]* 0.32 [0.27]
 $400–500 of minimum 0.43 [0.26]* 0.36 [0.31]
 >$500 of minimum 0.00 [0.24] 0.58 [0.28]**
Above-minimum spending if stay ($100s) × number of available plans within
 $100 of minimum −0.08 [0.05]
 $100–200 of minimum 0.03 [0.04]
 $200–300 of minimum 0.03 [0.04]
 $300–400 of minimum −0.01 [0.04]
 $400–500 of minimum −0.02 [0.04]
 >$500 of minimum −0.13 [0.04]***
2008 0.10 [1.50] 0.11 [1.49] 1.74 [1.55] −0.08 [1.67]
2009 −0.20 [2.23] −0.20 [2.24] 2.32 [2.06] −0.02 [2.26]
2010 1.16 [3.42] 1.09 [3.45] 3.64 [2.94] 1.55 [3.18]
Notes: Observations: 3,645,570. Standard errors from cluster-robust variance estimator clustered at the region-
year level are in brackets. All models also include individual fixed effects and controls for time-varying health. The 
number of plans by cost category and above-minimum spending in the status quo plan are defined using the ex post 
approach and assuming a price elasticity of demand for drugs of −0.54.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Regarding the main prediction of choice overload’s effects, the results in the first 
and third models indicate that adding all but the most expensive plans increases 
switching rates. Each additional available plan within $100 of the minimum increases 
switching by 0.6 percentage points. These positive effects persist but diminish across 
each relative cost category except the most expensive category. Adding more of the 
relatively worst plans to the choice set, those that would cost the individual more 
than $500 above her minimum-cost option, does not diminish switching. This is 
contrary to expectations under choice overload. Instead of promoting inertia, these 
results indicate that adding such cost-dominated options is simply irrelevant to indi-
viduals’ decisions to switch plans, e.g., because such plans are not part of individu-
als’ consideration sets.28
This null effect of adding the most expensive plans carries over to the results for 
the single measure of the total number of plans. As shown in Table 6, most of the 
within-person variation in the number of plans occurs from changes in this highest 
cost category. As a result, the 95 percent confidence interval on the effect of the total 
number of plans ranges from −0.2 to 1.0 with a point estimate indicating that each 
additional plan increases switching rates by 0.4 percentage points in the first model 
and 0.5 percentage points in the second. To assess directly how expanding the choice 
set by adding all but the most expensive plans affects switching, we reestimate equa-
tion (1) but using three alternative groupings of plans by their cost to the individual: 
the number of plans within $500 of the minimum versus above $500, i.e., grouping 
together all but the highest cost category in the third model; the number within $400 
and greater than $400; and the number within $300 versus greater than $300.
Table 8 presents results from these alternative groupings. All three approaches 
confirm that having more plans available increases switching unless the incremen-
tal plans are relatively expensive for the individual. For example, the results under 
“Model A” indicate that as an individual’s choice set size grows due to adding one 
more plan within $500 of her minimum-cost plan, she becomes 0.5 percentage 
points more likely to switch. In contrast, each additional plan with higher costs to 
her has no effect on her likelihood of switching.
The second and fourth models in Table 7 provide evidence regarding the second 
order choice overload effects of adding plans to the choice set. Neither set of results 
indicates that adding plans dampens individuals’ responsiveness to their status quo 
plans’ costs. The only statistically significant effect that appears is for expand-
ing the number of the most expensive plans, but the magnitude is minuscule and 
vastly  outweighed by the main effect of the cost of staying in the status quo plan.29 
28 A referee suggested an additional evaluation that splits the sample based on total drug spending to determine 
if the differences across the plan cost categories are due to differences between people. The specific question is 
whether the higher switching in response to adding lower cost plans was driven entirely by individuals with low 
drug consumption. The underlying hypothesis is that their task of comparing plans may be simpler than those with 
higher drug spending. To investigate this we split the sample into tertiles by average annual gross drug spending. 
All three tertiles exhibit within-person variation in the number of plans in each cost category, e.g., the highest tertile 
of drug spending had an average within person change of 5.2 plans within $100 of the minimum, compared to an 
average for the overall sample of 6.0. More importantly, the economically and statistically significant increase in 
switching due to adding more low cost options and the null effect of adding more high cost options is evident in the 
estimated parameters for all three tertiles.
29 For example, adding one more plan costing more than $500 above the lowest cost plan reduces the responsive-
ness to $200 higher in above-minimum spending in the status quo plan by 0.3 percentage points, but the net effect 
of $200 greater overspending is to increase switching by 13.9 percentage points. Likewise, incorporating the main 
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Likewise this lack of significance on the interaction terms in these models also indi-
cates that the marginal effects of adding plans do not change with the choice set size. 
That is, it provides no evidence for the presence of non-linearities that would result 
in people becoming less responsive to their status quo plans’ costs as the number 
of plans increases. Finally, across all four models the results show no statistically 
significant differences in conditional switching rates across the years in our sample. 
This provides evidence that inertia did not increase over time, which we investigate 
further in the next section.30
IV. Switching and Experience
We extend the model to evaluate how individuals’ switching decisions evolve 
over time. Specifically, we allow the responsiveness to the status quo plans’ rela-
tive costs to differ across years as well as with individual-specific experience. We 
also account for the fact that these within-person changes may be correlated with 
other factors such as changes in health. Hence we add three interaction terms to the 
switching model
(3)   S it =  θ t +  θ i +  α 1  A it +  α 2  A it ×  θ t +  α 2  N it +  α 3  H it 
 +  α 4  A it ×  N it +  α 5  A it ×  E it +  α 6  A it ×  H it +  u it .
effect shows that adding plans more than $500 above the lowest cost plan yields effects statistically indistinguish-
able from zero across almost the entire relevant range.
30 To evaluate whether the results in this section are sensitive to the chosen sample definition, we reestimated the 
models excluding switching decisions that did not meet a few additional criteria. These criteria eliminated decisions 
by anyone who moved between regions at any point from 2006–2010, the few instances where a “forced switch” 
occurred as a result of their status quo plans exiting the market, and decisions by those who later left the sample for 
various reasons, including death, acquiring a low-income subsidy, or switching to a Medicare Advantage plan. The 
results are virtually identical to those for the full sample.
Table 8—Parameter Estimates from Models of Switching  
with Alternative Categories of the Number of Plans by Cost, 2007–2010
Model A. Number of available plans within
 $500 of minimum 0.51 [0.27]*
 >$500 of minimum −0.06 [0.25]
Model B. Number of available plans within
 $400 of minimum 0.54 [0.26]**
 >$400 of minimum 0.09 [0.25]
Model C. Number of available plans within
 $300 of minimum 0.62 [0.26]**
 >$300 of minimum 0.24 [0.24]
Notes: Observations: 3,645,570. Standard errors from cluster-robust variance estimator clus-
tered at the region-year level are in brackets. All models also include individual fixed effects 
and controls for time-varying health. The number of plans by cost category and above-mini-
mum spending in the status quo plan are defined using the ex post approach and assuming a 
price elasticity of demand for drugs of −0.54.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The first interaction term,  A it ×  θ t , allows the effect of above-minimum spending to 
vary within person across years and the interaction term  A it ×  E it allows it to vary 
within person with experience (defined as the person’s cumulative months in a PDP 
without a low-income subsidy).31, 32
To mitigate any potential for bias due to heterogeneity in individual-specific 
responsiveness due to unobserved factors, we include a third interaction,  A it ×  H it . 
Rather than interacting the full set of  H it variables, we restrict the interaction to 
total current drug consumption, measured as gross spending on prescription drugs 
(in $1,000s) as an additional measure of relevant health; age in 2010 (as such it 
does not vary within individual over time, to limit collinearity with experience); and 
having been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease or related dementia because the 
prevalence of these illnesses is known to increase with age (Querfurth and LaFerla 
2010). As one specific example of the concerns this interaction accounts for is the 
possibility that those with greater experience were more responsive simply because 
their drug spending was higher, providing them with greater financial incentives 
to switch due to greater potential savings.33 Finally, to address any concerns that 
unobserved differences in responsiveness may still exist and be associated with 
experience due to the timing of the initial enrollment decisions, we re-estimated 
the model but excluded from all years those individuals who initially joined the 
PDP market during the extended initial open enrollment period of January 2, 2006 
through May 15, 2006.
Table 9 reports the results. For each year 2008–2010, individuals were more 
responsive to their status quo plan’s relative costs than they were in 2007. No statis-
tically significant differences in responsiveness exist between 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
Offsetting these year-specific gains, however, is the effect of individual-specific 
amount of time in the PDP market. Conditional on the year-specific effects, having 
more experience reduced individuals’ responsiveness to their status quo plan’s rela-
tive costs. As an example of the magnitude of this effect, an additional 12 months 
of experience reduces the responsiveness to a $200 increase in the status quo plan’s 
relative costs by 1.4 percentage points. Drawing causal inferences from this hinges 
on how well the model has controlled for other individual-specific time-varying 
factors that may affect responsiveness to the status quo plans’ costs. The coeffi-
cients on the additional interaction terms show statistically significant differences in 
31 Because our specifications include both individual-specific fixed effects and year fixed effects, we cannot also 
include a main effect for months of experience in Part D. Months of experience is a perfectly linear combination of 
the year indicators and individual fixed effects because it increases by exactly 12 months each year for each person 
in the sample.
32 In unreported results we also implemented models with the three-way interaction terms,  A it ×  θ t ×  E it , and 
found that the differences across experience levels in terms of responsiveness to the status quo plans’ costs was very 
similar across years.
33 The identification and interpretation of the estimated effects of experience are influenced by our approach. Due 
to our sample inclusion criteria and incorporation of individual-specific effects, the effects of individual-specific 
experience are identified only in 2008–2010. This is a result of the fact that we only evaluate decisions to switch for 
2007 by those who were enrolled for all of 2006. Hence no within-year variation in experience exists in our sample 
until 2008. One implication of this limitation is we cannot directly evaluate the role of learning in explaining the 
reductions from 2006 to 2007 while also accounting for individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity. A second 
concern may be that our estimates would miss the effects of experience if they occur primarily within the first partial 
year of enrollment. To evaluate this we implemented these models but included the switching decisions between 
a partial year of enrollment and a full year of enrollment. The coefficient on the experience interaction using this 
larger sample is virtually identical to that reported here.
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these  elasticities across the three observed time-varying characteristics we include. 
Specifically, the results show that those who are older are less responsive to the costs 
of staying in their status quo (consistent with the model in Stigler and Becker 1977), 
Table 9—Parameter Estimates from Models of Switching  
that Allow for Differences over Time, 2007–2010
Number of plans overall




2006 enrollees Full sample
Above-minimum spending if stay in  
 status quo plan ($100s)
4.08 [3.88] 2.16 [4.10] 2.21 [3.72]
Above-minimum spending if stay  
 ($100s) × 2008
3.21 [0.43]*** 3.10 [0.45]*** 3.36 [0.53]***
Above-minimum spending if stay  
 ($100s) × 2009
3.85 [0.70]*** 3.78 [0.65]*** 4.62 [0.70]***
Above-minimum spending if stay  
 ($100s) × 2010
3.79 [1.17]*** 3.74 [1.13]*** 4.86 [1.13]***
Above-minimum spending if stay  
 ($100s) × months of experience −0.06 [0.02]** −0.06 [0.02]*** −0.07 [0.02]***
Above-minimum spending if stay  
 ($100s) × age in 2010 −0.25 [0.05]*** −0.21 [0.06]*** −0.22 [0.04]***
Above-minimum spending if stay  
 ($100s) × has Alzheimer’s disease −0.72 [0.11]*** −0.56 [0.15]*** −0.79 [0.09]***
Above-minimum spending if stay  
 ($100s) × current gross drug  
  spending ($1,000s)
−0.03 [0.01]*** 0.00 [0.00]** −0.02 [0.01]**
Current gross drug spending ($1,000s) 0.22 [0.06]*** 0.15 [0.06]*** 0.27 [0.05]***
Number of available plans 0.41 [0.34] 0.32 [0.39]
Above-minimum spending if stay  
 ($100s) × number of available plans −0.02 [0.07]
0.01 [0.07]
Number of available plans within
 $100 of minimum 0.63 [0.30]**
 $100–200 of minimum 0.36 [0.30]
 $200–300 of minimum 0.13 [0.29]
 $300–400 of minimum 0.06 [0.26]
 $400–500 of minimum 0.11 [0.29]
 >$500 of minimum 0.33 [0.28]
Above-minimum spending if stay × number of available plans within
 $100 of minimum 0.01 [0.07]
 $100–200 of minimum 0.11 [0.07]
 $200–300 of minimum 0.12 [0.07]*
 $300–400 of minimum 0.07 [0.06]
 $400–500 of minimum 0.05 [0.06]
 >$500 of minimum −0.05 [0.07]
2008 −6.53 [1.75]*** −5.64 [1.88]*** −6.88 [1.77]***
2009 −7.33 [2.11]*** −7.31 [2.20]*** −8.68 [1.93]***
2010 −3.78 [3.36] −2.79 [3.83] −5.32 [2.96]*
Observations 3,645,570 2,077,059 3,645,570
Notes: Standard errors from cluster-robust variance estimator clustered at the region-year level are in brackets. 
All models include year fixed effects, individual fixed effects, and controls for time-varying health. The results in 
the column “excluding early 2006 enrollees” exclude from all years those who first entered the PDP market from 
January 2 through May 15, 2006. The number of plans by cost category and above-minimum spending in the sta-
tus quo plan are defined using the ex post approach and assuming a price elasticity of demand for drugs of −0.54.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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those with Alzheimer’s disease or other dementia are less responsive, and those with 
higher levels of drug spending are less responsive but more likely to switch overall. 
As evident from comparing the first two columns of results, all of these results are 
virtually identical between the full sample and the sample that excludes those who 
waited to join a PDP during the extended initial open enrollment period.34
To estimate the total within-person change in responsiveness over time we utilize 
the year main effects and the coefficients on  A it ×  θ t and  A it ×  E it . The results show 
that over time individuals became more responsive to higher levels of increases in 
their status quo plans’ relative costs but less responsive to lower levels. Table 10 
provides results based on the coefficients in the first column in Table 9. For example, 
people were 4.0 percentage points less likely to switch in response to a $100 increase 
(relative to her individual-specific mean above-minimum spending from staying in 
her status quo plan) in 2008 than they were in 2007 ( p < 0.01). In contrast, they 
were no different between 2007 and later years in their responsiveness to $200 or 
$300 increases. They were 5.9 percentage points more likely to switch in 2008 than 
2007 in response to a $500 increase ( p < 0.01). All of the differences diminish by 
2010, so that the only remaining difference from 2007 significant at the 10 percent 
level is that people were 12.4 percentage points more likely in 2010 to switch out of 
their status quo plan in response to a $1,000 increase relative to their minimum-cost 
plan. This increased responsiveness to larger increases relative to 2007 suggests that 
over time, people did not become more inert or pay less attention to their status quo 
plans’ relative costs.
V. Results from Alternative Modeling Approaches
In this section we evaluate the extent to which the results depend on the deci-
sions that analysts must make about individuals’ expectations regarding the relative 
34 As a final consideration of differences across cohorts, we estimated the model but restricted to the sample that 
joined the PDP market on January 1, 2006 and remained in it through the end of 2010, i.e., the same sample as used 
in Table 4. For this sample we cannot separately identify year and experience effects, so we exclude the  A it ×  E it 
term. The results confirm that this cohort was more responsive to all increases of about $300 or more in their status 
quo plans’ costs in 2008–2009 than in 2007 but had no statistically significant differences between 2010 and 2007.
Table 10—Estimated Conditional Within-Person Difference in Switching between 2007  
and Later Years in Response to an Increase in the Status Quo Plan’s Costs
Estimated difference from 2007 in the probability of switching
2008 2009 2010
Increase in above-minimum spending 
 if remain in the status quo plan
 $100 −4.04 [1.51]*** −4.93 [1.97]** −2.16 [3.15]
 $200 −1.55 [1.37] −2.53 [1.95] −0.55 [3.12]
 $300 0.94 [1.37] −0.13 [2.07] 1.07 [3.28]
 $400 3.43 [1.49]** 2.27 [2.30] 2.69 [3.59]
 $500 5.93 [1.72]*** 4.67 [2.61]* 4.31 [4.02]
 $1,000 18.38 [3.51]*** 16.67 [4.74]*** 12.40 [7.08]*
Notes: Estimates are based on the results from the first model provided in the preceding table. Standard errors from 
cluster-robust variance estimator clustered at the region-year level are in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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costs of their status quo plan in the upcoming year. Here we implement and report 
results from five alternative modeling approaches. First, we rely on the same ex post 
approach used above, but now we assume perfectly inelastic demand for prescrip-
tion drugs. That is, we hold the drug consumption constant across all plans despite 
potentially large differences across plans in the OOP prices of drugs.
The results from these models are in Table 11. These results replicate all of the 
insights from the elastic models above. The most important difference is that in this 
version, the moderately large positive main effect on the number of plans achieves 
statistical significance at the 10 percent level in the second model. As before, the 
interaction term remains insignificant and small. This is the opposite of a choice 
overload effect. Consistent with the ex post elastic results above, adding lower cost 
plans to the choice set increases switching. As before, the magnitude of this effect 
falls as the OOP costs of the additional plans grow and the effect of adding the most 
expensive plans is indistinguishable from zero.
Next, we implement an ex ante approach that assumes people choose based on the 
drug consumption in the current year (rather than the next year) but on plan design 
in the next year, just as in the ex post approach. In this approach, the cost calculator 
combines the individual’s claims from the current year with the plans’ formulary 
coverage and premiums from the upcoming year for which the person is making an 
enrollment decision. This approach mimics the costs that an individual would be 
shown by the online CMS “plan finder” tool if they followed the tool’s prompt and 
Table 11—Parameter Estimates from Ex Post Models of Switching  
Assuming Perfectly Inelastic Demand for Drugs, 2007–2010
Number of plans overall Number of plans by cost
No interactions Interactions No interactions Interactions
Above-minimum spending if stay in  
 status quo plan ($100s)
1.86 [0.20]*** 3.54 [1.37]** 2.08 [0.22]*** 3.97 [1.36]***
Number of available plans 0.41 [0.28] 0.52 [0.29]*
Above-minimum spending if stay ($100s) 
 × number of available plans
−0.03 [0.03]
Number of available plans within
 $100 of minimum 0.55 [0.26]** 0.88 [0.29]***
 $100–200 of minimum 0.56 [0.29]* 0.61 [0.29]**
 $200–300 of minimum 0.46 [0.27]* 0.40 [0.28]
 $300–400 of minimum 0.42 [0.25]* 0.33 [0.27]
 $400–500 of minimum 0.49 [0.26]* 0.45 [0.29]
 >$500 of minimum 0.32 [0.26] 0.58 [0.28]**
Above-minimum spending if stay ($100s) × number of available plans within
 $100 of minimum −0.08 [0.03]**
 $100–200 of minimum 0.01 [0.03]
 $200–300 of minimum 0.04 [0.03]
 $300–400 of minimum 0.02 [0.03]
 $400–500 of minimum −0.01 [0.03]
 >$500 of minimum −0.06 [0.03]**
2008 1.18 [1.48] 1.12 [1.50] 1.76 [1.49] 1.30 [1.58]
2009 1.66 [2.05] 1.63 [2.06] 2.30 [2.00] 1.67 [2.11]
2010 2.91 [3.09] 2.87 [3.12] 3.71 [2.94] 3.23 [3.08]
Notes: Observations: 3,645,570. Standard errors from cluster-robust variance estimator clustered at the region-year 
level are in brackets. All models include year fixed effects, individual fixed effects and controls for time-varying 
health. The number of plans by cost category and above-minimum spending in the status quo plan are defined using 
the ex post approach and assuming perfectly inelastic demand for drugs.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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entered current drug consumption.35 Thus the second alternative approach we report 
is this ex ante approach assuming elastic demand for drugs, while the third alterna-
tive is the ex ante version assuming perfectly inelastic demand for drugs.
The results from the ex ante models of switching are reported in Table 12. To 
streamline the presentation, we report both the elastic and inelastic versions but 
from only equation (1).36 Increasing the relative cost of remaining in the status 
quo plan promotes switching, as does expanding the availability of all but the most 
expensive plans. As with the ex post inelastic results shown in Table 11, the unre-
ported results from both the elastic and inelastic versions of the ex ante version 
of equation (2) show that the total number of plans has positive, moderately large 
effect on switching and is statistically significant at p < 0.10.
For the final alternative approach, in place of the ex post approach’s use of the per-
son’s actual prescription drug use in the upcoming year we instead employ a “ratio-
nal expectations” assumption.37 This approach, developed in the context of Part D 
in Abaluck and Gruber (2011), is based on the idea that individuals may be uncer-
tain about their individual future drug consumption but instead may have expecta-
tions regarding the possible distribution of expenses that they may have next year 
based on their current health and drug consumption patterns. In the rational expec-
tations modeling approach, the analyst attempts to approximate those expectations 
by assuming that the observed ex post outcomes of similar people  calculated for 
35 We are thankful to a referee for pointing out the importance of considering this approach especially given the 
design of the plan finder tool.
36 The results from these alternative results from models estimated by equation (2) are available from the authors.
37 We are thankful to a referee for suggesting we implement this alternative approach.
Table 12—Parameter Estimates from Ex Ante Models of Switching, 2007–2010
Elasticity of demand  
for drugs = −0.54
Perfectly inelastic demand  
for drugs
Number of plans 
overall
Number of plans  
by cost
Number of plans 
overall
Number of plans  
by cost
Above-minimum spending if stay  
 in status quo plan ($100s)
1.78 [0.35]*** 2.34 [0.52]*** 1.12 [0.16]*** 1.26 [0.19]***
Number of available plans 0.41 [0.29] 0.42 [0.28]
Number of available plans within
 $100 of minimum 0.50 [0.26]* 0.50 [0.26]*
 $100–200 of minimum 0.55 [0.28]* 0.55 [0.29]*
 $200–300 of minimum 0.48 [0.26]* 0.45 [0.27]*
 $300–400 of minimum 0.41 [0.25]* 0.41 [0.25]
 $400–500 of minimum 0.47 [0.27]* 0.47 [0.27]*
 >$500 of minimum 0.18 [0.26] 0.37 [0.27]
2008 0.18 [1.41] 1.12 [1.41] 0.74 [1.40] 1.06 [1.40]
2009 0.58 [2.05] 1.87 [1.93] 1.66 [1.95] 1.95 [1.90]
2010 1.86 [3.13] 3.30 [2.85] 2.85 [2.95] 3.34 [2.84]
Notes: Observations: 3,644,298. Standard errors from cluster-robust variance estimator clustered at the region-year 
level are in brackets. All models include year fixed effects, individual fixed effects, and controls for time-varying 
health. The above-minimum spending in the status quo plan is defined using the ex ante approach.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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each available option represent the individual’s perceived distribution of expenses. 
Here we adopt the Abaluck and Gruber (2011) methodology wholesale and define 
“similar” based on the deciles of their prior year’s gross drug spending, days’ sup-
ply of branded drugs, and days’ supply of generic drugs. For our purposes, for each 
plan we then calculate the average of the ex post calculated OOP costs among all of 
the similar individuals in the region. Our one point of divergence from the preced-
ing method is that we average across only non-subsidy PDP enrollees in the same 
region, i.e., all of those for whom we had calculated costs in the plan under the 
ex post approach.38
Table 13 provides the results from the models that rely on the rational expecta-
tions approach to estimating the individuals’ future costs of their status quo plan. 
Of all the modeling approaches, this one yields the largest main effects of the status 
quo plan’s costs on switching. For example, the first model reported in this table 
implies that each $100 increase in the status quo plan’s relative costs leads to a 
5.5 percentage point increase in the probability of switching. As before, expanding 
the choice set by adding more lower cost options increases the probability of switch-
ing whereas adding high cost options has no effect.
38 This contrasts with the Abaluck and Gruber (2011) approach, as they used a random sample of 200 people 
from the population of all similar individuals in their data calculated through every plan to define the type-specific 
calculated averages for the plan. For example, they would have used a Medicare Advantage enrollee in Alaska in 
their calculation of the rational expectations measure for the type-specific expected OOP costs in a stand-alone 
PDP in Florida, but they would not have used another similar Florida PDP enrollee if she was not among the 200 
randomly chosen individuals.
Table 13—Parameter Estimates from “Rational Expectations” Models of Switching, 2007–2010
Elasticity of demand  
for drugs = −0.54
Perfectly inelastic demand  
for drugs
Number of plans 
overall
Number of plans 
by cost
Number of plans 
overall
Number of plans 
by cost
Above-minimum spending if  
 stay in status quo plan ($100s)
5.48 [0.54]*** 6.40 [0.67]*** 2.57 [0.39]*** 2.76 [0.44]***
Number of available plans 0.32 [0.40] 0.44 [0.28]
Number of available plans within
 $100 of minimum 0.54 [0.28]* 0.46 [0.29]
 $100–200 of minimum 0.55 [0.28]* 0.57 [0.29]*
 $200–300 of minimum 0.43 [0.27] 0.47 [0.25]*
 $300–400 of minimum 0.31 [0.26] 0.38 [0.25]
 $400–500 of minimum 0.27 [0.27] 0.46 [0.25]*
 >$500 of minimum −0.18 [0.28] 0.38 [0.26]
2008 −2.32 [1.67] 0.28 [1.67] −0.74 [1.49] 0.40 [1.55]
2009 −3.86 [2.78] −0.5 [2.27] 1.38 [2.12] 1.66 [2.01]
2010 −1.76 [4.45] 1.24 [3.28] 2.90 [3.22] 3.52 [2.99]
Notes: Observations: 3,483,504. Standard errors from cluster-robust variance estimator clustered at the region-year 
level are in brackets. All models include year fixed effects, individual fixed effects and controls for time-varying 
health. The number of plans by cost category and above-minimum spending in the status quo plan are defined using 
the “rational expectations” approach.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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VI. Conclusions
Our analysis yields two primary conclusions regarding the influence of choice 
overload and experience on inertia in the context of switching between Medicare 
PDPs. First, within the range of choice set sizes in Part D through 2010, increasing 
the number of available low cost options (within $500 of the individual’s minimum 
cost plan) increases individuals’ likelihoods of switching plans. By switching, indi-
viduals reduce their own annual spending by an average of over $200. Our results 
for indiscriminate expansions of the choice set typically show no effect on switching 
rates, albeit several versions of our models yield marginally significant increases in 
switching due to larger choice sets. Likewise, increases in the number of plans does 
not diminish people’s responsiveness to their status quo plans’ costs.
These results represent consilience among several related domains of research 
in which adding options promotes switching (e.g., Lancaster 1966, Huber, Payne, 
and Puto 1982, and Simonson 1989). These results contradict the subset of existing 
research on choice overload that is commonly appropriated for the Part D context. 
Although differences in the existence of choice overload can be found across prior 
studies, a widely acknowledged precondition for choice overload to exist is that 
consumers must not have strong existing preferences for certain products or product 
attributes (Iyengar and Lepper 2000). Our results suggest that such preconditions 
are not met in Part D. Further, the increase in switching from adding low cost plans 
and the irrelevance of adding high cost plans is inconsistent with choice overload. 
These results are consistent with models in which consumers ignore options that are 
strongly dominated on an attribute such as costs.
One common hypothesis regarding choice overload is that its effects are nonlin-
ear. Nonlinearity implies that marginal changes in size in the relatively large choice 
sets that have existed in Part D may have no effect on inertia whereas marginal 
changes in small choice sets that have not yet existed in Part D may have either pos-
itive or negative effects. This hypothesis is not supported by our consistent finding 
that adding plans to the choice sets that existed in Part D for 2007–2010 increased 
switching as long as those plans are not too expensive. Although it is possible 
that the magnitude and even sign of the effects of adding options may vary across 
choice set sizes, researchers cannot directly test how switching decisions may be 
affected by changes in choice set size if the choice sets were extremely restricted 
relative to those under Part D currently. Any predictions about such effects are 
vastly out of sample.
Research from other contexts, however, provides some potential insights. The 
experimental research overall has not found any evidence of non-linearities in the 
choice overload effect (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd 2010), and other 
empirical research found evidence of choice overload due to expansions in choice 
set size at sizes even larger than those we study (Kempf and Ruenzi 2006). The 
experiments of Besedeš et al. (2012) found that the marginal benefits of larger 
choice sets actually increased with choice set size. On balance then, large but previ-
ously unimplemented restrictions of Part D choice sets may have positive or nega-
tive consequences not evident from the marginal changes studied here. Given that 
switching increases with additional low cost options, however, the data do not sup-
port the view that at even the smallest choice set sizes in Part D to date consumers 
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are simply too overwhelmed to pay attention to their status quo plans’ costs relative 
to the alternatives.
Our second primary conclusion is that individuals did not become less sensitive 
to their status quo plans’ costs over time. In fact, Part D enrollees’ switching deci-
sions for 2007, the first year possible for switching, were less responsive to high 
costs of their status quo plan than any other year from 2008 through 2010. Likewise, 
 above-minimum spending in 2010 remained below their 2007 levels, and switch-
ing rates were virtually flat throughout the study period. These patterns hold even 
among the cohort that enrolled in a PDP on January 1, 2006 and remained in the 
market without a low-income subsidy through the end of 2010. Among this most 
experienced cohort, the 2010 switching rates were higher and above-minimum 
spending in percentage terms lower than any prior year.
These within-person changes over time in Part D relate to several of the  well-known 
articles on inertia from other contexts. For example, our finding that inertia does not 
increase over time is consistent with the results in Madrian and Shea (2001) show-
ing that participation in the firm’s retirement plan increased with the employee’s 
tenure with the firm. In contrast with Part D, however, in their context of retirement 
planning neither improvements in the available information nor  individual-specific 
learning are likely to be important as consumers have little ability to discern whether 
their prior choices maximized their objective functions. Similarly, another fre-
quently cited article demonstrating consumers’ inattentiveness relied on choices of 
only entirely inexperienced first-time consumers, precluding its ability to consider 
how such attention evolves over time (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006).
Regarding the within-person changes over time observed here, the identification 
comes from a relatively short time window that incorporates two to four switch-
ing decisions per person. Thus it remains to be determined how these effects have 
evolved since 2010. For example, the within-person time trends observed here may 
not be generalizable due to the recession that occurred during this time period or due 
to any one-time improvements in the complementary information market, e.g., from 
improvements in the CMS plan finder website. The overall similarity between 2007 
and 2010 in consumers’ responsiveness to their status quo plans’ costs suggests 
that the within-person time trends observed here, coupled with the observed nega-
tive effect of individual-specific experience, may have resulted from the newness of 
Part D in ways that may not continue as Part D matures.
Throughout the early years of Part D, concerns have been raised that compe-
tition was suboptimal because of consumer inertia (e.g., Heiss, McFadden, and 
Winter 2010). This view is based on the presumptions that inertia in Part D is both 
widespread and anticompetitive. Our results here build on prior research and call 
into question both presumptions. To the extent that inertia is present, Dube, Hitsch, 
and Rossi 2009 point out that it should increase competition for initial enrollment 
choices. Our data show that by 2010, fully half of those who had ever previously 
enrolled in a PDP were no longer in their original plans. This observed level of 
turnover for Part D, in conjunction with CMS regulations that prohibit insurers from 
offering teaser rates to new enrollees, limits firms’ ability to harvest gains from 
existing enrollees without also losing potential new enrollees. Finally, in contrast 
with individuals’ likelihood of remaining in their status quo plan growing over time, 
our results show that over time people became more likely to switch away from their 
231ketcham et al.: paying attention or paying too muchVol. 105 no. 1
status quo in response to it becoming relatively much more expensive. Collectively 
the evidence here provides little support for fears that consumer inertia is heightened 
by either greater time or larger choice sets in Part D.
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